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It is commonly believed that monetary
gain is the cause of gambling behavior in
humans. Mesolimbic dopamine (DA), the
chief neuromediator of incentive motiva-
tion, is indeed released to a larger extent
in pathological gamblers (PG) than in
healthy controls (HC) during gambling
episodes (Linnet et al., 2011; Joutsa et al.,
2012), as in other forms of compulsive and
addictive behavior. However, recent find-
ings indicate that the interaction between
DA and reward is not so straightforward
(Blum et al., 2012; Linnet et al., 2012). In
PG andHC, DA release seems to reflect the
unpredictability of reward delivery rather
than reward per se. This suggests that the
motivation to gamble is strongly (though
not entirely) determined by the inability
to predict reward occurrence. Here we dis-
cuss several views of the role of DA in
gambling, and attempt to provide an evo-
lutionary framework to explain its role in
uncertainty.
TRADITIONAL VIEW: MONEY DRIVES
GAMBLING
Common sense suggests that if gambling
at casinos is attractive for many people, it
is because it offers an opportunity to win
money (Dow Schüll, 2012). Of course, a
“big win” is rare, but the random com-
ponent behind most games and the pub-
licizing of big winners lets people believe
that the chance of winning a lot is not so
unlikely. In this traditional view, money
is a gambler’s primary motivation, and
randomness in games allows the gambler
to hope that the gains will overcome the
losses.
This view is compatible with the evi-
dence that DA released in the nucleus
accumbens, a mesolimbic region in the
brain, magnifies the attractiveness of
rewards and conditioned cues (Berridge,
2007). Mesolimbic DA transforms neu-
tral cues into conditioned cues when they
come to reliably predict reward deliv-
ery (Melis and Argiolas, 1995; Peciña
et al., 2003; Flagel et al., 2011). Money
is certainly a strong conditioned cue,
which has been associated with abundance
and power in all human civilizations.
As with other reward sources, money is
known to enhance mesolimbic DA lev-
els in the human striatum during gam-
bling episodes, suggesting that money is
what motivates gamblers (Koepp et al.,
1998; Zald et al., 2004; Zink et al., 2004;
Pessiglione et al., 2007). For example,
Joutsa et al. (2012) showed that DA is
released in the ventral striatum during
instances of high- but not low-reward, in
both PG and HC, and that the severity of
symptoms in PG is associated with larger
DA responses.
THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF LOSSES
Although the traditional view is in agree-
ment with neuroscientific data, it fails to
explain why people often describe gam-
bling as a pleasant activity rather than
as an opportunity to gain money. During
gambling episodes, PG report euphoric
feelings comparable to those experienced
by drug users (van Holst et al., 2010),
and the more PG lose money, the more
they tend to persevere in this activity—
a phenomenon referred to as loss-chasing
(Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2008). Such
results are hardly compatible with the tra-
ditional view. Animal and human studies
indicate that the role of DA in reward is,
at least in gambling, more complex than
initially believed (Linnet, 2013).
Determining the exact timing of sub-
jective feelings or how losses spur on a
gambler’s desire to play during gambling
episodes is difficult because different emo-
tions and cognitions constantly overlap.
Nevertheless, Linnet et al. (2010) were
able to measure mesolimbic DA release
in PG and HC winning or losing money.
Unexpectedly, they found no difference in
dopaminergic responses between PG and
HC who won money. Dopamine release in
the ventral striatum, however, was more
pronounced for the losses in PG rela-
tive to HC. Given the motivational impact
of mesolimbic DA, Linnet and colleagues
argue that this effect could explain loss-
chasing in PG. In addition, they point
out that “PG are not hyperdopaminergic
per se, but have increased DA susceptibil-
ity toward certain types of decisions and
behavior” (p. 331). This finding that DA
release is higher in PG losing money than
in PG winning money is consistent with
the evidence that “near misses” enhance
the motivation to gamble and recruit the
brain reward circuit more than “big wins”
(Kassinove and Schare, 2001; Clark et al.,
2009; Chase and Clark, 2010). Possibly
related to this phenomenon is the evidence
that, compared with gains, the amount of
monetary losses has limited effect on the
extent to which probabilistic (and delayed)
losses are discounted in humans (Estle
et al., 2006). This suggests that a lower
probability (and a longer delay) reduces
a gambler’s motivation less when losses
rather than gains are involved. In contrast,
the big win hypothesis suggests that patho-
logical gambling develops in individuals
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that initially experienced large monetary
gains, but the attempts to demonstrate
this effect on persistence of gambling
have failed (Kassinove and Schare, 2001;
Weatherly et al., 2004). Current evidence
therefore suggests that losses contribute to
motivate gambling more than gains.
THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF REWARD
UNCERTAINTY
One of the main underlying factors to the
phenomenon of loss-chasing may relate
to the importance of reward uncertainty.
Studies have shown that reward uncer-
tainty rather than reward per se, will
magnify mesolimbic DA, both in mon-
keys (Fiorillo et al., 2003; de Lafuente
and Romo, 2011) and healthy human
participants (Preuschoff et al., 2006). In
PG, accumbens DA is maximal during
a gambling task when the probability of
winning and losing money is identical—
a 50% chance for a two-outcome event
representing maximal uncertainty (Linnet
et al., 2012). Although non-dopaminergic
neurons might also be involved in the
coding of reward uncertainty (Monosov
and Hikosaka, 2013), these results based
on electrophysiological and neuroimaging
techniques indicate that DA is crucial for
the coding of reward uncertainty. This sug-
gestion is corroborated by a large number
of behavioral studies, showing that mam-
mals and birds respond more vigorously
to conditioned cues predicting uncertain
rewards (Collins et al., 1983; Anselme
et al., 2013; Robinson et al., under review)
and tend to prefer an uncertain food
option over a certain food option in dual-
choice tasks (Kacelnik and Bateson, 1996;
Adriani and Laviola, 2006), sometimes
despite a lower reward rate (Forkman,
1991; Gipson et al., 2009). According to
Greg Costikyan, an award-winning game
designer, games cannot hold our inter-
est in the absence of uncertainty—which
can take many forms, occurring in the
outcome, the game’s path, analytical com-
plexity, perception, and so on (Costikyan,
2013). Discussing the game of Tic-Tac-Toe,
Costikyan (p. 10) notes that this game
is dull for anyone beyond a certain age
because its solution is trivial. The reason
why children play this game with enjoy-
ment is that they do not understand that
the game has an optimal strategy; for chil-
dren, the game of Tic-Tac-Toe produces an
uncertain outcome. A predictable game is
dull, just like a detective novel for which
the identity of the murderer is known in
advance. Based on this assumption, Zack
and Poulos (2009) note that several pay-
off schedules (slot machines, roulette, and
dice game of craps) have a probability of
winning close to 50%, so that they are
expected to elicit maximal DA release and,
therefore, reinforce the act of gambling.
The evidence that uncertainty itself
appears to be a source of motivation is
visible in the growing trend of patholog-
ical gambling that involves extended play
at video poker or slot machines (Dow
Schüll, 2012). Individuals are playing to
play rather than to win, and monetary
wins are conceived as the opportunity to
extend the duration of play, rather than the
game’s main objective. In addition, game
programmers have uncovered a profitable
trend toward larger and larger number
of bets per round of a given game (in
Australia, >100 bets on a given roll), with
smaller and smaller amounts (going as low
as one cent), giving rise to a “losses dis-
guised as wins” effect, where players win
less than they wagered (Dixon et al., 2010).
It is almost as if players were drawn to plac-
ing bets or trying to uncover the algorithm
that determines the wins and losses (this is
often reported in players, see Dow Schüll,
2012). Recently, we have shown in adult
rats that an initial exposure (8 days) to
conditioned cues predicting highly uncer-
tain rewards sensitizes responding to those
cues in the long term (for at least 20
days) despite a gradual reduction in the
level of uncertainty (Robinson et al., under
review). No behavioral sensitization was
apparent following a later exposure to high
uncertainty (rewards were provided with
certainty during the first 8 days). This
result is compatible with other findings
showing that persistent gambling behav-
ior is more likely to occur in individuals
that experience unpredictable environ-
ments and gambling situations early in
life (Scherrer et al., 2007; Braverman and
Shaffer, 2012).
A POSSIBLE EVOLUTIONARY ORIGIN
OF GAMBLING BEHAVIOR
Since wins are rare and often small during
gambling episodes, it is unlikely that they
are sufficient to motivate people to perse-
vere in the task. The fact that losses can
motivate gambling more than gains is also
difficult to understand. So, why do people
gamble? Pathological gambling is certainly
maladaptive behavior, but the attractive-
ness of uncertain rewards is so widespread
in the animal kingdom that this ten-
dency should have an adaptive origin. Here
we suggest a hypothesis—referred to as
the compensatory hypothesis—developed
by one of the authors, that describes
gambling-like behavior in an evolutionary
framework (Anselme, 2013).
In nature, animals are subject to a
lack of cognitive control in many circum-
stances; they are often unable to predict
what is going to happen. This essen-
tially occurs for two reasons. First, the
distribution of natural resources is ran-
dom, so that a large number of responses
must be produced before finding vital
resources. Second, the reliability of con-
ditioned cues is often imperfect—e.g., for
some species, fruit-trees may act as con-
ditioned cues because of their associa-
tion with reward (the presence of fruits),
but this association is unreliable since
fruit-trees have no fruits for most of the
year. Given this lack of cognitive con-
trol about objects and events, it can be
argued that if reward uncertainty were
not a source of motivation, most behav-
iors would extinguish because of the high
failure rate (and energy loss) experienced
by animals. The compensatory hypothesis
suggests that, when a significant object or
event’s predictability is low, motivational
processes are recruited to compensate for
the inability to make correct predictions;
motivation would act as a mechanism to
delay extinction (Anselme, 2013). In other
words, allowing an animal to persevere
in a task is only possible if its behavior
is motivated by the lack of predictability
(i.e., uncertainty) rather than by reward
itself. The compensatory hypothesis could
explain why losses are so important
in motivating human gamblers: without
the opportunity of receiving no reward,
gains become predictable and hence most
games become dull (Costikyan, 2013).
In addition, this hypothesis provides an
interpretation to the evidence that, like
physiological deprivations (Nader et al.,
1997), psychosocial deprivations such as a
lack of maternal care enhance mesolim-
bic DA release and, correlatively, incen-
tive motivation to seek food (Lomanowska
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et al., 2011). Psychosocial deprivations
also seem to be a cause of gambling-like
behavior in both pigeons and humans
(van Holst et al., 2010; Pattison et al.,
2013). In fact, all forms of depriva-
tion result from the inability to predict
how to find/obtain appropriate stimuli—
whether food, social relationships, oppor-
tunities to work and play, etc. In most
cases, this inability is a consequence of
environmental poverty. On account of
this, poor environments resemble unpre-
dictable environments and the compen-
satory hypothesis suggests that, in both
cases, a higher motivation is recruited to
persevere in the laborious task of finding
resources.
Assuming that this interpretation is
correct, gambling behavior in humans
could be phylogenetically inherited from
older mammalian species whose mem-
bers motivated by reward uncertainty had
a better chance of survival in complex,
dynamic environments. Pathological gam-
bling might be the exaggeration of a nat-
ural tendency exploited by casinos and
games of chance. Of course, uncertainty-
driven motivation is no longer required
to survive within most western cultures.
However, gambling might be hijacking an
evolutionary system designed to resolve
uncertainty by spurring pulses of moti-
vation, despite or because of repeated
losses. How could pathological gambling
be addressed? We think that this psy-
chopathology should certainly be treated
on a case-by-case basis, depending on the
vulnerability of each PG. For example,
favoring enrichment of a PG’s daily envi-
ronment by varying leisure activities and
social relations may reduce his desire to
seek a surplus of stimulation. At a societal
level, one approach allowing to address
pathological gambling might be that gam-
blers at casinos can win more often than
they lose but only very small gains (sim-
ilar to the wagered amounts) in order to
render gambling persistence less attractive.
More thorough investigations are needed
to identify the parameters underpinning
the addictive power of games and to pro-
mote the development of games which do
not exploit our phylogenetic vulnerability.
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